Abstract: A controversial aspect of payment cards has been the "no-surcharge rule." This rule, which is part of the contract between the card provider and a merchant, states that the merchant cannot charge a customer who pays by card more than a customer who pays by cash. In this paper we consider the design of an optimal card-based payment system when cash is available as an alternative means of payment. We find that a version of the no-surcharge rule emerges as a natural and advantageous feature of such a system. JEL classification: D830, E420
Introduction
1 especially the "shoe-leather" cost of visiting an ATM, estimated at more than $.28 per transaction-is taken into account. As this last number is necessarily somewhat imprecise (for example cash can circulate in ways that are not easily observable by econometricians), we would still argue that cash remains the cheapest way to pay in many situations.
The dominant component of the cost of a card payment is the merchant fee (a.k.a.
"merchant discount") paid by a seller of goods or services to the card company. In the U.S. this fee averages about 2% of the purchase amount. 3 Usually this fee is not paid explicitly by the buyer, but is instead deducted from the merchant's payment by the card provider, and the buyer pays the same price as he would have using cash.
Payment card providers reinforce this practice with a contractual provision known as a no-surcharge rule (NSR, a.k.a. "no-discrimination rule") that prohibits merchants from assessing a fee on customers who wish to pay with their credit or debit card. 4 The no-surcharge rule has been extremely controversial, and has been banned in some countries (e.g., Australia; see Lowe 2005 ) as a form of collusive price-…xing.
Critics of NSR have argued that it ine¢ ciently encourages the use of more costly forms of payment (credit cards) to less costly (cash), leading to what the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia has termed a "Gresham's Law of Payments" (Macfarlane 2005 ). 5 Against the cost disadvantages must be set the bene…ts of card payment: certainly in the case of credit cards at least, paying by card allows buyers to tap into their credit lines in a convenient and straightforward way. But this argument does not apply in the case of debit cards or credit cards that are paid o¤ every month. "Paybacks" 3 Average merchant fees on credit card transactions in 2005 were 2.19% for MasterCard and Visa, 2.41% for American Express, and 1.76% for Discover (Nilson Report, Issue 862, 2006). 4 Under U.S. law consumers are still entitled to negotiate discounts if they o¤er cash. Such discounts are rarely o¤ered for routine purchases, however. In some other countries even this practice is prohibited. 5 See Chakravorti and To (1999) for a formal presentation of this idea. Lowe (2005) notes that surcharging for card use is still uncommon in Australia, despite the regulatory removal of NSR.
2 to card use, in the form of frequent ‡yer miles, cash-back, or other rewards, further increase buyers incentives to use cards, but paybacks do not explain why still-cheaper cash is not preferred.
Of course, the Coase Theorem would predict that the NSR is irrelevant, as long as all parties to a transaction are able to contract around it. Papers in the industrial organization literature, such as Rochet and Tirole (2002) , contend that the Coase Theorem can fail in a payments environment, due to an asymmetry in market power between merchants and consumers. 6 Absent a no-surcharge rule, it is argued, monopolistic merchants may ine¢ ciently shift the costs of a card payment system to consumers, leading to the underprovision of credit and welfare losses.
Below, we abstract from industrial organization issues and instead focus on other frictions that could cause the NSR to matter and the Coase Theorem to fail. These are the standard frictions that give rise to the use of payment systems: time mismatches of agents'trading demands, private information about agents'preferences, and limited enforcement of their pledges to repay. As in actual payment situations, the term "limited enforcement"incorporates both the potential anonymity of buyers and sellers, and, once identi…cation has occurred, a limited ability to apply penalties when an agent defaults.
Next we introduce a transactions technology, which, at a cost, allows for relaxation of these frictions. This technology, which we interpret as a credit-card payment system, must compete with an alternative payments technology in the form of cash.
To make cash as attractive as possible, we assume it is uncounterfeitable, not subject to theft, can transferred for free, and that it bears little or no in ‡ation tax. We then consider how a planner would structure an optimal credit card system when cash is available, and …nd that a version of the no-surcharge rule can emerge as an advantageous feature of such a system.
The intuition behind this result is simple. In our environment, agents early in 6 For surveys of the extensive I/O literature on card payments see Chakravorti (2003) , Hunt 3 their life-cycle always need credit, whereas older agents never do. For young agents to access credit, they must forsake the anonymity associated with cash payment and join the credit-card payment system. But young agents'participation in this system is pointless, unless a su¢ ciently large number of older agents also agree to take part.
A no-surcharge rule promotes ongoing participation in credit arrangements by, in e¤ect, taxing the use of cash. Thus, in our model, the use of credit card system has both a private and social bene…t, and a no-surcharge rule allows agents to internalize the e¤ects of their participation.
This result should be cast in a proper light. Since our analysis pertains to the design of an ideal card payment system, it renders no verdict on pricing structures in existing card payment systems. Rather, it shows how the oft-discussed "network bene…ts" of card payments can arise in a general-equilibrium world, and how an absence of surcharges can be instrumental in the capture of these bene…ts.
The Environment
Modeling choices. Evaluation of NSR obviously requires an environment where agents may pay either with cash or with a card To provide some minimal degree of verisimilitude, credit cards in particular should incorporate both a "credit"or recordkeeping function and a "payment" function-identi…cation of otherwise anonymous transactors (Kahn and Roberds 2005) . That is, the credit cards in the model should, just as with actual credit cards, serve the dual purpose of recording agents' agents transaction histories and correlating transactors with histories.
Versimilitude also requires that credit card debt be subject to some stringent limitations on enforcement. Credit card debt is rarely collateralized and by its nature somewhat risky. While most credit card debt is eventually paid o¤ (default rates average about 4 percent in the U.S.), very little of the defaulted debt is ever collected. 
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The need to incorporate limited enforcement sets our analysis o¤ from standard cashgood/credit-good approaches in the macro literature, e.g., Lacker and Schreft (1996) , where this friction does not arise. Agents produce and consume two types of nonstorable goods: a specialized good and a numeraire good. Utility (disutility) of consumption (production) of the numeraire good is linear. Consumption of the numeraire good is denoted as the negative of "hours worked"h.
There is a linear cost q s of producing q s units of the specialized good. All agents enjoy utility u(q) when they consume q units of the specialized good, where u 0 (q) > 0;
Trading stages. Each period has two sub-periods, each with its own market.
Markets in both sub-periods are Walrasian in the sense that no agent has market power. The nature of trading is quite di¤erent in the two subperiods, however.
In the …rst subperiod, the numeraire good is exchanged and a trader's identity can be veri…ed by other agents at zero cost, should the agent decide to make his identity available. We call this stage the settlement stage. At the end of the settlement stage a randomly selected proportion 1 of the …nite-lived agents die and are replaced by young agents. Upon reaching their second settlement period, …nite-lived agents become inherently indistinguishable from other agents and are referred to as "adults."
In the second sub-period, the trading stage, the specialized good is exchanged in "incomplete anonymity."This means that in this stage, agents are unrecognizable to one another, absent the application of some costly identifying technology (discussed in detail below). Application of this technology allows an agent's identity to be determined with perfect accuracy; however agents again always decide whether they want to be identi…ed and may remain anonymous if they so prefer.
Within the trading stage, a proportion a 2 (0; 1) of the population has the opportunity to actively engage in trade. Of these, a randomly selected proportion 1 n have the desire to consume specialized goods produced by others; otherwise they be-come potential producers with probability n 2 (0; 1). 
The …rst equality is the market clearing condition for the specialized good in the trading stage. The second constraint is the market clearing condition for the numeraire good during the settlement stage.
First best allocation
We begin by considering optimal allocations in the absence of information and enforcement constraints. The expected utility of a representative young agent just born, in his very …rst period of life, is
The expected utility of an adult at the start of a trading stage is likewise
We take the planner's objective function to be the maximization of the populationweighted sum of the agents' utility (ignoring the zero-measure group of immortal agents)
Using the market clearing conditions, this reduces to
Therefore a …rst best allocation is one that satis…es q y = q = q where
We will denote the …rst best allocation by q . In words, a …rst-best allocation requires that the utility of consuming an additional increment of the specialized good equals the cost of producing this increment, for almost all consumers, i.e., for both the young and adults. 
The …rst-order and envelope conditions give
It follows that m +1 is independent of the past trading history of agent which is summarized in m, and all adults exit the settlement stage with the same holdings of cash.
The discounted lifetime utility of adults when they enter the trading stage with m units of cash is
where q and q s are set optimally as follows.
An adult producer at the trading stage solves
with …rst-order condition
Therefore using (2) we have
The problem of an adult consumer is
and the …rst order condition gives
where V 0 (m pq) has been replaced by using (2) . That is to say, either > 0 in which case the consumer's budget constraint binds so that q = m=p and u 0 (q) > p, or the budget constraint does not bind, = 0 and q solves u 0 (q) = p .
The discounted lifetime utility of a young agent entering the trading stage is given by
where m = 0. The problem of a young producer and a young consumer are identical to their adult counterparts. The solution of a young producer's problem is identical to that of an adult; however a young consumer must choose q y = 0 as he lacks the necessary cash to make a purchase.
The market clearing condition for the trading stage re ‡ects the fact that young would-be buyers cannot consume, and is given by
It is now easy to determine the value of an additional unit of money when (adult) agents exit the settlement stage. Using the solution to the buyer's problem, this is
However, we know that p = 1 and
Hence we obtain another equilibrium condition, which characterizes the quantity consumed in the trading stage as a function of the money growth rate
We can now de…ne and characterize a stationary monetary equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium is a list ( ; q) such that (1) and (4) hold.
Proposition 1 A stationary monetary equilibrium exists for all and is unique for all > . The equilibrium allocation q is strictly decreasing in .
The proof of the proposition follows immediately from condition (4) . Note that if the Friedman rule holds, = and adult consumers always hold enough money to purchase the e¢ cient amount, i.e., in equilibrium u 0 (q m ) = 1. This does not attain the …rst best however, as young buyers must postpone consumption until they have acquired the necessary stock of cash.
10 10 We do not place too literal an interpretation on this very simple life-cycle pattern of consumption.
What is important is that the cash constraint binds at some point over agents'life cycle.
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4 The cash-credit economy The anonymity prevalent during the trading periods means that agents cannot increase their consumption by simply issuing bonds: absent some means of identifying the bond issuer, such a bond would be worthless. Consequently the credit arrangement must also incorporate some technology for identifying debtors. To …x ideas, we imagine that this identi…cation occurs using credit cards.
More speci…cally, we may imagine that the planner relies on a club arrangement known as a credit card institution (CCI). 11 The CCI incurs monitoring and set-up costs 0 in ascertaining the identity of new credit card holders ("members").
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This cost is denominated in the numeraire good and must be borne by agents using the CCI. Once it has incurred this cost, the CCI can costlessly verify agents as members and record a member's transactions. However it cannot observe whether an agent's state is "active" or "inactive" at the trading stage, or whether an agent trades with cash in the trading stage. The identities of in…nite-lived agents are unveri…able, which 11 A club arrangement is quite natural since identi…cation of an agent is a sort of nonrival good.
Reliance on the club implicitly assumes that the planner is solving a constrained Pareto problem of maximizing the welfare of those within the club. This constraint will be inessential in the cases studied below, where (almost) all agents decide to join the club. 12 As in Kahn and Roberds (2005, KR), each new member, upon veri…cation of his identity, receives a unique, uncounterfeitable credit card that may be subsequently veri…ed at zero cost. Following KR,
we will exclude the possibility of fraud on the supplier ("merchant") side. This means that in every trading period, once a CCI member identi…es himself as a supplier, his delivery (or nondelivery) of specialized goods within that period becomes observable.
12 prevents them from joining the CCI.
The CCI will seek to implement the …rst best allocation q in the trading stage.
Hence, CCI does not seek to maximize pro…t but only to achieve q and to recover costs. Following KMT, we will design the terms of the credit card institution so that agents truthfully reveal their state (consumer, producer, inactive) and so that they are willing to participate in the credit card arrangement given the outside option of using cash. The CCI has no control over monetary policy and takes the money growth rate as given.
As in KMT, we assume that the CCI assigns credit balances to participants. It We should note that the CCI cannot impose any direct penalty on a member with low balances who does not readjust his balance during a settlement period. That is, a CCI member can walk away from the arrangement at any time. The only penalty that the CCI can apply is denial of future access.
We de…ne a credit card system (CCS) to be an array of functions fL t ; K t ; B t ; q g.
A CCS is feasible if it satis…es some incentive and participation constraints (speci…ed below). A CCS is simple if balance adjustments do not depend on the agents'current balances and are therefore history independent. A feasible CCS is optimal if it implements the e¢ cient trading-period allocation q . Note that a CCS requires the existence of a CCI in order to identify agents. As in the cash economy, the trading stage is still a Walrasian market. The auctioneer has a list transmitted by the CCI of those eligible to use credit. The auctioneer then calls a price p and quantities (q m ; q s;m ) consumed and produced when cash is used, as well as the terms of the CCS. Then CCI members decide if they will participate, and if so, whether they will use cash or credit. That is, they may participate anonymously as cash agents, or they may allow themselves to be identi…ed, and participate in the credit market. CCI members thus have the opportunity to use cash rather than credit at any time. In…nite-lived agents remain outside the CCI, and will always use cash. Hence, while an active cash market will always exist, a successful CCS should contain incentives such that CCI members transact using credit.
In such a system, prices and quantities have to clear the market. We assume that the auctioneer does not cross-subsidize consumption across those agents that use cash and those that use credit. 13 More precisely, the auctioneer faces two market clearing conditions. Given that active agents are sellers with probability n and buyers with probability 1 n, these market clearing conditions are
(1 n) q m = nq s;m :
We also exclude the possibility of cross-subsidization through the central bank: only agents holding currency in the settlement period are eligible to receive lump-sum transfers from the central bank. This might occur, for example, if currency becomes worn after a single period, so that cash holders must submit old banknotes in order to obtain new ones.
In the previous section, we have studied the problem of agents who only have access to cash. We now describe the problem of agents with access to the CCI. 
Settlement stage
s.t.
The …rst order condition with respect to money gives
13 Some policy discussions of NSR have focused on the issue of potential cross-subsidization between purchasers using cash and those using cards. The present model does not address this issue since, in equilibrium, the CCS will be utilized by (almost) all agents or none. We abstract from this issue in order to focus on the patterns of "subsidization" across heterogeneous cardholders, that are needed to sustain the CCS when cash is available as an alternative.
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The Note that the linearity in preferences implies that the value function Z (b; m) is linear in credit balances and cash holdings.
Also, for any b, it should be the case that CCI members are better o¤ (at the settlement stage) staying in the system than choosing to use cash forever after. This no-default constraint imposes that for any b,
In the Appendix, we show that this requirement reduces to
The cost-recovery constraint in the settlement stage requires that CCI members cover monitoring costs for young agents joining the CCI
Trading stage
We now turn to the problem faced by CCI members during the trading round. Agents make reports to the auctioneer about their state (consumer, producer, inactive).
Those that report "producer" receive instructions from the auctioneer to produce 14 Expression (8) is somewhat restrictive in that it apportions the veri…cation costs equally across all CCI members. More complicated schemes are feasible, but these are not observed in practice and are unlikely to change the results below. In particular, note that the planner cannot simply assign the veri…cation costs to the bene…ciaries of the CCI-the young. For su¢ ciently low in ‡ation rates, this would imply that every young consumer would default during his …rst settlement stage and the CCI would collapse.
q s . Consumers receive q . The auctioneer subsequently communicates the identity and reports of those CCI members that made use of the CCS to the CCI, which then makes balance adjustments depending on these reports.
For agents to report their state truthfully, some conditions have to be satis…ed.
In particular, incentive constraints require that the following inequalities hold:
The …rst (second) constraint states that a consumer (producer) must be at least as well o¤ declaring his true state than reporting he is inactive. The third constraint states that an inactive agent does not …nd pro…table to claim that he is a consumer.
Since the value function Z is linear, these conditions simplify to
In addition, participation constraints require that producers, consumers, and inactive CCI members respectively, are better o¤ using credit than cash; i.e., where m can be zero. The …rst constraint states that a seller is better o¤ producing the e¢ cient amount and incurring balance adjustment K than reporting inactivity, incurring adjustment B (if he stays in the credit arrangement) and selling his good for cash instead. The second constraint states that a consumer is better o¤ consuming the e¢ cient quantity using credit than reporting inactivity (or opting out of the credit arrangement) and using cash. The third condition, the participation constraint for the inactive agents, is just a special case of the no-default condition (7) and drops out. Note that condition (7) implies that if they use cash, active credit agents will prefer to stay in the credit arrangement. Exploiting the linearity of the value function Z, the nonredundant participation constraints can be rewritten as
Simplifying these expressions using p = 1, these reduce to
Now, if (12) and (13) hold then (10) and (9) hold as well.
As before we con…ne our attention to stationary equilibria and require that +1 M +1 = M . We also require that b X = b;+1 X +1 , where X denotes any balance adjustments. In the following we will normalize b = 1 and consider constant balance adjustments. We are now in a position to de…ne a cash-credit equilibrium and state the main results of the paper (proofs are in the Appendix).
De…nition 2 A stationary cash-credit equilibrium is a credit system (L; K; B; q ) and a list ( ; q m ) satisfying the (1), (4), (7), (8), (11), (12) and (13).
In words, a cash-credit equilibrium must satisfy the conditions for a stationary monetary equilibrium, as well as the no-default, cost-recovery, incentive, and participation constraints necessary to sustain the CCI. In such an equilibrium, only the zero-measure group of in…nite-lived agents transacts with cash. All other transactions occur through the CCI. However, when the participation constraint is satis…ed for low monitoring costs, the value of cash then matters by a¤ecting the no-default constraint (7). The intuition is as follows. As the monitoring cost increases, participants in the credit arrangement have to contribute more to the credit arrangement in each period. Their incentive to use cash then increases. The credit arrangement will then only exist for relatively high values of , i.e., high implicit costs of holding cash. As increases, then from (4) the value of cash decreases and the level of consumption obtainable with cash decreases, making the credit arrangement more attractive.
Proposition 3 Credit increases welfare if
The proof for this proposition considers the case where = , so that cash is costless to hold for all agents. In this case only young agents are penalized in a cash economy, as they cannot consume in their …rst trading period. However, if the monitoring cost is low enough, young agents are better o¤ ex-ante if they access the credit arrangement and then amortize the cost of the monitoring over subsequent periods, than by foregoing the chance to consume in their …rst period of life. The threshold is given by the the expected gain from participating in the trading stage in the …rst period of life, minus the cost of acquiring cash in the next settlement stage to consume q , that is, q = q .
The threshold value obviously depends on the probability of consuming in the trading stage: if this probability is too low, then is negative and credit does not increase welfare.
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The No-Surcharge Rule
A version of NSR arises quite naturally from the cash-credit equilibrium described above. We say that a cash-credit equilibrium follows a no-surcharge rule when a consumer's per-unit cost of purchasing a specialized good through the CCS does not exceed his cost of making the same purchase using cash. 15 Expressing consumers' cost of a credit purchase of q specialized goods (and so incurring balance L) in terms of the numeraire good, then NSR holds if
Recalling that in equilibrium p = 1 and rearranging, this reduces to
In the Appendix we that that if the Friedman rule is in e¤ect so that = and q m = q , then the no-default condition (7) reduces to
which implies the no-surcharge rule (14) . Since q < ( q ), then by continuity, no-surcharge must also hold for rates of money growth slightly larger than . We state this as
Corollary 4
In the cash-credit equilibrium, the no-surcharge rule (14) must hold for su¢ ciently close to :
Hence, for monetary policies su¢ ciently close to the Friedman rule, NSR is an integral feature of a welfare-enhancing credit arrangement. At higher money growth rates, however, no-surcharge may not hold. In other words, no-surcharge is needed exactly when the implicit cost of using money is low, and some enticement is necessary to induce agents to transact through the CCS. 15 By stating this rule as an inequality we allow for the possibility of paybacks for card use.
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The cash-credit equilibrium may also require that producers of specialized goods, in e¤ect, pay a form of merchant fee when they receive credit payments, i.e., that they receive less compensation per unit sold than producers who sell for cash. Analogous to no-surcharge condition (14), we can say that a merchant fee is charged when a producer obtains less by selling on credit (and so obtaining balance K) than he would have by selling for cash, i.e., when
To see that a merchant fee can be charged in equilibrium, note that cost-recovery condition (8), combined with incentive constraint (11), places an upper bound on the compensation K of producers who sell for credit, as measured in terms of the numeraire
When the Friedman rule is in e¤ect, we can then use (15) to get the following upper bound on the credit producer's compensation
Producers who sell for cash obtain
Thus, merchants pay a merchant fee to receive credit payments if RHS(17) < RHS(18), which can clearly occur for a close to 1.
These calculations demonstrate that a cash-credit equilibrium in the model can mimic the seemingly paradoxical real-world preference for card payments over cash.
For the cases considered, adult consumers who have a low-cost alternative to the credit arrangement (i.e., cash) still have an incentive to pay by credit, since the price of paying by credit is no more than paying by cash. Producers agree to sell goods on credit, even though they receive less (in numeraire terms) than they would if they sold for cash.
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The key to this somewhat magical arrangement is the possibility that an agent may be in an inactive state during the trading stage, combined with the agent's private knowledge of his state. The possibility of inactivity is meaningful because it implies that nonparticipation in the trading-stage market does not necessarily coincide with defection from the credit arrangement. Agents can be induced to truthfully reveal themselves as consumers, however, by in e¤ect "charging a fee" to inactive agents, thereby keeping consumers' price of credit purchases low. This in turn discourages consumers from defaulting and going over to cash. Inactive agents and producers in our model continue to participate because they realize that at some point they will bene…t as consumers.
The critical role of the inactive state can be illustrated if we now suppose the Friedman rule holds and simultaneously drive a ! 1, so that agents are always active during the trading stage. In the case we must set the inactive agents'balance B = 0 in conditions (9)- (13) . Under the Friedman rule, the producers'participation constraint (12) reduces to
which is inconsistent with the no-default condition (15) . Not coincidentally, (19) also violates the no-surcharge condition (14) ; adult agents would have no incentive to keep making credit purchases, and the credit arrangement collapses.
To summarize, in our model NSR plays the socially valuable role of making people demand credit who don't need it. The use of credit by adults who are not creditconstrained is bene…cial to the young agents who are. No-surcharge is a way of bribing the adults into supporting the young. No-surcharge would not matter without limited enforcement: if adults could be compelled to transact through the CCI, the no-default constraint (7) would drop out and the planner would have more ‡exibility about how to allocate the costs of the credit arrangement.
22
Literature review
The approach outlined above follows the papers in the money literature that model credit arrangements as clubs, where membership in a club implies mutual knowledge of club members' identities and histories (or a su¢ cient subset thereof). 16 As in many of these papers, our model also allows club members the option of transacting anonymously with cash, which serves to tighten members'participation constraints.
In such models, if money is divisible then credit arrangements become di¢ cult or impossible to sustain when the monetary policy follows the Friedman rule. Our model avoids this fate by introducing young (credit-constrained) agents, and by restricting the ability of the central bank to make transfers to these agents. Thus credit is still useful even when cash is cheap. but cash is more widely accepted than cards (so cash has value). Again our focus is somewhat di¤erent, as we try to provide an explanation of how credit cards might displace cash under an optimal payments arrangement, even for purchases by buyers who are not credit constrained.
Conclusion
Above we have presented an environment where some type of payment system is needed for exchange. Fiat money allows some trades to occur but does not attain a …rst best allocation, even when the central bank follows the best possible policy, the In the environment studied, no-surcharge is only valuable when there is both limited enforcement of debts and private information about cardholder's ability to supply a good, i.e., "repay." But since these frictions are pervasive in real-world payment situations, this restriction may be seen as more a feature than a limitation.
More generally we have attempted to illustrate how the tools of monetary theory can be applied to the analysis of payment systems. Although our model is quite stylized, it also highlights the key services provided by these systems-identi…cation (authentication) and recordkeeping-in a fully dynamic, general-equilibrium environment. This approach may prove a useful one in exploring the nature of the bene…ts such systems provide, as well as the many policy issues associated with their operation.
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7 Appendix: proofs
Derivation of the no-default condition
By de…nition, agents with balance b 2 fK; L; Bg do not default whenever
The inactive agents'incentive constraint (11) imposes B L. Also, from the incentive constraint for sellers (10), we have K > B. Hence, consumers receive the minimum balance adjustment from participation in the CCS. It is therefore enough to consider the no-default condition for consumers, or
From the linearity of Z in m we have
so that the no-default constraint (20) becomes
Again using linearity of Z, this is
From the budget constraint of cash buyers in the trading stage we have m +1 = p +1 q m .
Also, from (3) we have
Using linearity of H this is
where the last inequality follows from (8) . Therefore we may restate (20) as
To derive the second inequality, we used the fact that the expected hours worked on the settlement stage for a cash agent are by market clearing a [(1 n) h b + nh s ] + (1 a) h i = 0. Rearranging terms, the no-default condition is then given by
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Normalizing b = 1 we have two equilibrium equations characterizing the cash side of the economy:
Hence, we need . The constraints on the credit side of the economy are
From these constraints it follows that setting B = L slackens all the other constraints, thus increasing the set of parameters for which a cash-credit equilibrium exists. Hence we set B = L in what follows. The inequalities for the credit side of the economy then become
Condition (22) is always satis…ed and is therefore redundant. From the cost-recovery condition we get an expression for K as a function of L.
(Note that the merchant fee measured in terms of the numeraire is p K= (25) in (21) we can reduce the constraints for the credit arrangement to
Arranging terms we get
Therefore an equilibrium exists if
which is equivalent to
When > , the left hand side of (26) Finally, a cash-credit equilibrium will not exist if the expected payo¤ from participating in the credit scheme is negative, that is if
Therefore a cash-credit equilibrium exists if and only if = max fb ; 0 g :
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Credit increases welfare relative to cash whenever the expected welfare in the credit economy is higher than the expected welfare in the cash economy, i.e., when
Recalling that p = 1 and m +1 = q m , this is equivalent to
Which, under the best-case scenario for cash (Friedman rule) is the same as (1 n) n q ,
(1 an) q (1 an ) a (1 n) q 30 holds for a close enough to 1 and > 0, producers paid by credit are receive less than those who are paid by cash (note however that a cash producer must still make a payment to the CCS as an "inactive"agent to remain within the CCS). Under the no-default condition, however, producers are still willing to participate in the CCS, and receive payment through the CCS, as they will bene…t from the CCS when they are consumers.
